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BOOK REVIEW
A MIRROR CRACK'D? THE RULE OF LAW
IN AMERICAN HISTORY
By Kermit L.
Hall. New York: Oxford University Press 1989. Pp. 404. $32.50
THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY,

CHRISTOPHER

L. TOMLINS*

She
She
She
She

left the web, she left the loom,
made three paces thro' the room,
saw the water-lily bloom,
saw the helmet and the plume,
She look'd down to Camelot.
Out flew the web and floated wide;
The mirror crack'd from side to side;
"The curse is come upon me," cried
The Lady of Shalott. 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Mirrors, whether as metaphors of reflection and refraction or
of emulation, have long proven irresistible to scholars struggling
for convenient ways of representing social and institutional relationships in society. Students of law, dating from the anonymous
medieval author of The Mirrourof Justices,2 are no more immune

* 1989-90 Senior Fellow of the Commonwealth Center for the Study of American
Culture and Visiting Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William
and Mary. Reader in Legal Studies, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia. B.A.,
Oxford University, 1973; M.A,, University of Sussex, 1973, Oxford University, 1977, and
The Johns Hopkins University, 1977; Ph.D., The Johns Hopkins University, 1981. I am
grateful to Michael Grossberg, Daniel Ernst, and David Rabban for their comments on
an earlier draft of this Article.
1. A. TENNYSON, The Lady Of Shalott, in POEMS OF TENNYSON 25-29 (J. Buckley ed.
1958). I am indebted to John Horacek of the Borchardt Library for his assistance in
pinpointing this reference.
2. ANONYMOUS, THE MIRROUR OF JUSTICES (circa 1300). Relied upon unquestioningly by
Sir Edward Coke, The Mirrour of Justices was later described by Pollock and Maitland
as "so full of fables and falsehoods that as an authority it is worthless." 2 F. POLLOCK &
F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 478 n.1 (2d ed. 1968).
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than any other. "What a subject is this in which we are united,"
Oliver Wendell Holmes told an 1885 Suffolk Bar Association
Dinner in the speech in which Kermit Hall has found the title of
this book, "this abstraction called the Law, wherein, as in a magic
mirror, we see reflected, not only our own lives, but the lives of
all men that have been!"3 More recently than Holmes, but drawing
upon the vein of legal studies inspired, at least in part, by the
4
quasi-sociological observations that introduced The Common Law,
Lawrence Friedman has resorted to the same device. "This book,"
Friedman wrote in the preface to the first edition of A History
of American Law, "treats American law . . . not as a kingdom
unto itself, not as a set of rules and concepts, not as the province
' 5
of lawyers alone, but as a mirror of society.
Professor Hall writes in the broad tradition of Holmes and
Friedman, so perhaps it is not surprising that again the metaphor
of first choice should be that of law the mirror. There are other
similarities, not least that his, like theirs, is an ambitious attempt
at an authoritative overview. Hall's goal is to restate the "best
current understanding" about the evolution of American legal
6
culture in order to provide, consciously, a scholarly milestone.
In pursuit of this goal, Hall draws widely on the scholarshipnotably that of Willard Hurst, Lawrence Friedman, Harry Scheiber, Morton Horwitz, and their contemporaries, as well as a
number of younger scholars-that since 1960 has remade the
history of law in America as the history principally of social and
economic processes. The result is a book that surveys four centuries of American legal development in fewer tjian 350 detailpacked pages.7 Hall weaves skillfully into one narrative themes

3. THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 21-23 (M. Howe ed.
1962) [hereinafter OCCASIONAL SPEECHES]. As I shall explain in my concluding remarks,
Holmes borrowed this image from Alfred Lord Tennyson's superb Arthurian romance,
The Lady of Shalott, A. TENNYSON, supra note 1. Hence my intermittent references to
that work.

4. O.W.

HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW

(1881). I refer here, of course, to Holmes' eminently

quotable and oft-quoted introductory remark:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions
of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges
share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed.
Id. at 1.
5. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 10 (1973).
6. K. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY vii (1989).
7. Id. Aesthetically, the book suffers somewhat from its publisher's choice of a small
typeface and cramped margins, presumably to keep the page count as low as possible.
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of evolution in the structure of legal institutions at the local,
state, and national level; the changing substance of public and
private law; and the administration of criminal justice. He illustrates comprehensively the impact of law on social, economic,
racial, and domestic relationships. He shows how one may write
effectively about law in the context of American political history,
and he shows how the historically segregated agendas of legal
and constitutional historians may be united sensitively in one
synthesis. 8 Written in part to furnish a manageable text for
survey courses, The Magic Mirror will be found intelligible and
informative by diverse audiences of historians and legal academics, whether students or scholars. This is no mean achievement,
and in this respect the book is an undoubted success. Yet curi-

This format gives the text the appearance of having been crammed onto the page and
does not make for particularly easy reading. The book's footnotes are also not at all
comprehensive, a real problem in a project so dependent on the work of other scholars.
Hall partially redeems this failing in a useful bibliographic essay in which he draws
attention to those works upon which he has relied most.
8. The organization of such a project is a major element in its success or failure.
Although the book generally is clear, I found its organization not without some problems.
Hall's approach is both chronological and topical, and sometimes these characteristics get
in each other's way. The first four chapters, id. at 9-86, take us chronologically through
the colonial and Revolutionary eras, with clearly written and easy to follow chapters
divided into topical categories. Five topical survey chapters follow, id. at 87-188, which
deal successively with law and economy in the antebellum period (two chapters), race
and slavery, domestic relations, and the criminal justice system. The last three topics
are taken to the close of the nineteenth century. Hall then returns to the Civil War as
the point of departure for two chapters on law and industrialization, 1860-1920, id. at
189-210, 22646, which are, however, separated by an intervening chapter on the legal
profession, id. at 211-25. Then comes a chapter on the formation of modern legal culture
through 1945, id. at 247-66, a chapter on the Depression, id. at 267-85, and chapters on
contemporary (postwar) law and society and on the imperial judiciary. The twentiethcentury chapters follow through on the topics discussed in the nineteenth-century chapters-race, gender, criminal justice-but in a more abbreviated fashion.
Because Hall tends to keep his topics fairly distinct, this organization is problematic
in that it inhibits comparative generalization across topics. In addition, it inhibits the
emergence of a clear sense of periodization and causation. The Civil War, for example,
features repeatedly as a significant chronological divider, but its causative significance,
if any, is never clear. The relationship between the legal culture chapters and the
industrialization and Depression chapters, id. at 211-85, suggests that the author sees the
former as playing a determining role, but this is nothing more than a hint and the
concluding observations of the book contradict it. Finally, the double chapters on law and
the economy before and after the Civil War tend to be very repetitive, as Hall organizes
them with one focussed primarily on legislative activity ("the state") and the other on
judicial activity ("the judiciary"), surveying the same policy agenda twice. The separation
inhibits close analysis of the dynamics of legislative-judicial competition for initiative in
policy formation. For recent examples of such analysis concentrating on the post-Civil
War period, see Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L.
REv. 1109, 1126-48 (1989); Hattam, Economic Visions and Political Strategies: American
Labor and the State, 1865-1896, 4 STUD. Am. POL. DEv. 82, 106-16 (1990).
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ously-for there is much here that speaks of a desire to innovate-the book is excessively cautious and also somewhat dated.
Although Hall uses the work of many recent scholars, he reproduces little of the interpretive excitement that has characterized
legal history over the last ten or fifteen years. Hall leaves much
of his own interpretation implicit, so the reader has to work hard
to figure out his line of argument. At the end of it all, however,
The Magic Mirror leaves one with the distinct impression that
ultimately Hall chose to restate an orthodoxy in the face of
intellectual phenomena that have shaken its foundations. 9
Professor Hall writes:
If we are to make progress, we must have works that attempt
to sum up our legal past. We must pause occasionally to try
to synthesize and integrate into a larger body of knowledge
that which we do know, and, in so doing, press future scholars
to cast a revisionist eye on its assumptions.10
This Review aims to assess Hall's synthesis precisely in the
manner he recommends here. Part II casts a revisionist eye over
the methodology and assumptions that guide his text. Part III
summarizes analytically the substance of the book. Finally, Part
IV returns to the matter of assumptions and specifically to what
I see as, in this case, their blinkering effect.
II.

WARP AND WEFT

There she weaves by night and day
A magic web with colors gay.

9. The orthodoxy I refer to here is that of the so-called "Wisconsin School," which
championed the application of behavioral social science methods to legal history. Pioneered
by Willard Hurst, this approach has been taken furthest in development and refinement
(and sheer authorial panache) by Lawrence Friedman. On the Wisconsin School, see

Grossberg, Legal History and Social Science: Friedman'sHistory of American Law, the
Second Time Around, 13 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 359 (1988). As both Grossberg and other

commentators-notably Gordon, Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law
Tradition in American Legal Historiography, 10 LAW & Soc'y REV. 9 (1975-76)-have
underlined, this orthodoxy, like most, was at its inception not an orthodoxy at all, but
revolutionary and subversive. Id.; Grossberg, supra.
Hall confirms my judgment of his sympathies in his article, American Legal History as
Science and Applied Politics, 4 BENCHMARK 229 (1990). I am very much indebted to
Professor Hall for his courtesy in making a copy of this piece available to me in advance
of publication.
10. K. HALL, supra note 6, at viii. Lawrence Friedman was the last scholar to hang
out a target in this fashion when he offered A History of American Law as "a whipping
boy, a primer, something to react to; a shape for the field, even if others find it misshapen."
L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 10.
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She has heard a whisper say,
A curse is on her if she stay
To look down to Camelot.
She knows not what the curse may be,
And so she weaveth steadily,
And little other care hath she,
The Lady of Shalott. 11
The similarities in metaphor, scholarly orientation, and avowed
authorial intent to which I have adverted invite explicit comparison between The Magic Mirror and Lawrence Friedman's A
History of American Law. Hall follows Friedman's tracks quite
closely in a number of respects,12 but one important difference
in perspective is apparent early on. In 1972, Friedman declared
that he had set out to write a history of American law that took
"nothing as historical accident, nothing as autonomous, everything as relative and molded by economy and society," one
grounded on "[tlhe basic premise . . . that, despite a strong dash
of history and idiosyncrasy, the strongest ingredient in American
law, at any given time, is the present: current emotions, real
economic interests, concrete political groups."'13 Although admiring of Friedman's achievement, Hall doubts the sufficiency of so
determinedly instrumentalist an approach. 14 Critical of what he
sees as the strong tendency among post-Friedman historians to
write of law solely as a creature of its social context, he argues
for a legal history sensitive to the content as well as the consequences of the law, to its form as well as its function, to the
legacy of the past as well as the demands of the present. 5 Law
is a human institution, its history "a tale of human choices . . .
of individuals caught up in the efforts of the state to allocate
blame, to deter criminal behavior, to punish wrongdoing, and to
encourage socially valuable activity."' 6 But law is also "a cultural
artifact,' ' 7 persisting over centuries and transcending individual
lives. 18 Hence, "we cannot know the law only through the indi-

11. A. TENNYSON, supra note 1.
12. Hall discusses the similarities and differences in content and perspective between
his work and Friedman's. K. HALL, supra note 6, at viii.
13. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 14-15. Friedman reconfirmed this approach in the
second edition. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 15-16 (2d ed. 1985).
14. K. HALL, supra note 6, at 4.
15. Id. at 3-4.
16. Id. at 4.
17. Id.

18. Id.
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viduals who have administered and lived under it. We trivialize
the rule of law, and we miss the opportunity to sort out the
clashing views about it, when we disregard its inner logic and
rules, its institutions, and its processes."'19 True to this form, The
Magic Mirroris to be "about law, constitutions, legal institutions,
and the idea of the rule of law as separate subjects," as well as
part and parcel of "our social history."20 Resorting to a second
common metaphor, law the black box, Hall wants us to be
sensitive to "both the internal and external history of American
law."

21

Hall pursues this revised agenda through an exploration of the
"connective tissue" of the legal system-its structure, substance,
and culture. 22 By "structure," Hall means the formal (courts,
legislatures, administrative agencies, executives) and informal
(the family, private associations, trade groups, unions) institutions
that produce and administer law, and the procedures that these
institutions have developed to sustain that function.3 Here, as
elsewhere in the book, Hall reveals a positivist bent:
The purpose of legal history is not to explain all social choices
and all aspects of social control. The distinctiveness of the
American legal system has been its reliance on a formal structure, and it is with the understanding of the place of that
formal structure in society that American legal history is
24
concerned.
Hall does not, therefore, give his attention to informal institutions
as arenas of power and the production of law in themselves, but
only insofar as they are impacted by, or perform as transmission
25
belts for, the law of the formal system.

19. Id.

20. Id. at 3.
21. Id. Hall credits the black box metaphor to L. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW 138-53
(1984). Cf. Gordon, supra note 9, at 10-11 (describing the "internal legal historian" as
staying within the legal box and the "external legal historian" as writing "about the
interaction between the boxful of legal things and the wider society of which they are a
part").
22. K. HALL, supra note 6, at 4.
23. Id. at 5.
24. Id. Thus, "[a]ll
law is a system of social choice backed by the power of the state."
Id. at 7.
25. This perspective leads Hall to leave some rather important gaps in his history. For
example, he does not consider the household in his colonial chapters, notwithstanding its
key status as an arena of primary jurisdiction both in early modern Anglo-American law
and in cultural practice. For work suggestive of the potential of a household focus in the
recovery of colonial legal cultures, see Isaac, Communication and Control: Authority
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Hall's approach to structure determines the nature of substance, the second of Hall's three elements. By "substance," Hall
means the outputs-the "primary rules"-of the formal system:
its judicial pronouncements, statutes, executive orders, and administrative regulations. Law, then, is the discourse of officials.
This characteristic does not necessarily lend it uniformity. Indeed,
presaging one of the most important themes of his book, Hall
argues that one should see American law as historically multiform
both in structure and substance: "There has never been only one
26
American legal system, but permutations and deviations." Multiformity, however, is the product of jurisdictional plurality rather
than the product of ideological diversity or ideational incoherence.
The multiplicity of regional sovereignties both before and after
the creation of the federal state resulted in plural power centers
and thus a plurality of official discourses.
The last of the legal system's three elements, culture, is also
the most important. Describing the concept of "legal culture" as
"genuinely elusive," Hall sees it first as "a manifestation" of
ideology, defined as "strong ideas about how the world should
and does operate," and second as having "evolved in response
to" individual and group interests. 27 Hall defines individual and
group interests in terms of material interests and personal attributes: "[p]roperty holding, social class position, wealth, and
race." 28 Gender is a notable absentee from this list, although Hall
does resort to gender as a descriptive category in the body of
the book.29 Together, ideas and interests interact to create "the
matrix of values, attitudes, and assumptions that have shaped
30
both the operation and the perception of the law.."
Hall's formulation of the culture concept is problematic on
several counts. First, it differentiates between ideology and interests in such a way as to present the latter, race for example,

Metaphors and Power Contests on Colonel Landon Carter'sVirginia Plantation, 1752-1778,
in RITES OF POWER: SYMBOLIsle, RITUAL, AND POLITICS SINCE THE MIDDLE AGES (S. Wilentz
ed. 1985). See also R.

STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES

(rev. ed. June 1989) (forthcoming 1991).
Giving such consideration to the colonial household would have required Hall to devote
greater time in his discussion of the "emergence" of a new law of domestic relations in
the nineteenth century to showing how this emergence was in part at least a process of
rearrangement of other "orders of things"-a process of disassembly and reassembly of
other legal logics-involving, for example, the hiving off of master and servant law from
the law of the household.
26. K. HALL, supra note 6, at 5.
27. Id. at 6.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 328-30.
30. Id. at 6.
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as objective characteristics, not as in themselves ideological or
cultural constructs.3 ' Second, Hall discusses neither component
nor, indeed, the culture concept itself theoretically; that is, in a
manner that would enable one to understand with some precision
what Hall means when he says that together they constitute
American legal culture. 32 On its face, Hall's formulation actually
does not do much more than recycle the old "ideas and interests"
formulation to which numerous American historians have resorted over the years in discussing policy formation.
The way Hall applies the concept, however, suggests the most
important weakness of Hall's formulation of legal culture. Legal
culture has enormous potential as a concept of general analytic
use. For example, one can quite easily conceive of conducting
research into "the legal culture of American workers." This
research could explore phenomena such as rule-oriented behavior,
modes of legitimating the exercise of power in interpersonal
relations, concepts of justice, legality, authority, rights, right
action, and so forth in specific settings and over time. It could
attempt to compare the results to similar research on other
specific populations and to assumed social norms and values. The
research could assess the extent of each population's contribution
to the maintenance of those norms, examine specific instances of
interaction, and tease out divergences. We already have some
samples of what such research, both historical and anthropological, might look like." Hall, however, gives legal culture a much

31. Id.
32. Given the intensity with which social and intellectual historians (and law and society
scholars) have debated the potential of cultural anthropology and ethnography as sources
of methodological and empirical insight in recent years, Hall's failure to attempt to situate
this attempt at writing a history of legal culture in that historiographical context is both
regrettable and puzzling. See, e.g., Appleby, Value and Society, in COLONIAL BRITISH
AMERICA: ESSAYS IN THE NEW HISTORY OF THE EARLY MODERN ERA 290-316 (1984); W.
REDDY, MONEY AND LIBERTY IN MODERN EUROPE: A CRITIQUE OF HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING
(1987); Henretta, Social History as Lived and Written, 84 AM. HIST. REV. 1293 (1979);
Lears, The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities,90 Am. HIST. REV.
567 (1985); Walters, Signs of the Times: Clifford Geertz and Historians,47 Soc. RES. 537
(1980); see also infra note 34.
33. See, e.g., Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded
Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767; Hartog, Pigs and Positivism, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 899; see also
M. BURAWAY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT: CHANGES IN THE LABOR PROCESS UNDER MONOPOLY
CAPITALISM (1979); P. FRIEDLANDER, THE EMERGENCE OF A UAW LOCAL, 1936-1939: A
STUDY IN CLASS AND CULTURE (1975); J. GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS: QUIESCENCE
AND REBELLION IN AN APPALACHIAN VALLEY (1980); Merry, Everyday Understandings of
the Law in Working-Class America, 13 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 253 (1986); Merry, Concepts of
Law and Justice Among Working-Class Americans: Ideology as Culture, 9 LEGAL STUD. F.
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more restricted meaning: almost without exception, legal culture
here means the operational assumptions and values associated
with the formal legal system and the legal profession. 34 To be
sure, these assumptions and values "evolve[ ] in response to" the
interests of other social actors 3 5 which Hall tends to lump together as "the general culture." Nevertheless, the realm of the
legal in society is defined by the institutional and ideological
frontiers of the law box. 36 This is not all that surprising, given
Hall's positivist definition of what constitutes legal history. It is,
however, highly limiting, not least on Hall himself. The reader
may notice, for example, that notwithstanding its status as one
of the three organizing concepts for the entire book, legal culture
does not begin to feature in any analytically significant or systematic way until two-thirds of the way through the book, when
it becomes Hall's point of entry into a description of the world
of bench and bar in the later nineteenth century.37
Despite its absence from the first two-thirds of the book, the
culture concept gets primacy in Hall's description of how the

59 (1985).
For examples of work with similar implications for historical exploration of the legal
culture of slaves and slavery, see Grossberg, supra note 9, at 375-79. For examples of
work exploring the legal culture of women, see S. LEBSOCK, THE FREE WOMEN OF
PETERSBURG: STATUS AND CULTURE IN A SOUTHERN TOWN, 1784-1860 (1984); Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything That Grows:" Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L.
REV. 819.
Finally, for examples of work suggestive of the discrete legal cultures associated with

different forms of social and political movements, see N. POLLACK, THE JUST
POPULISM, LAW, AND HUMAN WELFARE (1987); N. SALVATORE, EUGENE V. DEBS:

POLITY:
CITIZEN

AND SOCIALIST (1982). The issue of sharply contrasting conceptions of legality is posed in
M. FOUCAULT, POWERJKNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS, 1972-1977,

at 1-37 (1980), and in a somewhat different fashion by Forbath, Hartog, & Minow,
Introduction: Legal Histories from Below, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 759. On the relationship
between societal ideologies and the values of individuals and groups, see J. THOMPSON,
STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF IDEOLOGY

(1985); Lears, supra note 32; Mann, The Social

Cohesion of LiberalDemocracy, 35 Ai. Soc. REV. 423 (1970).
34. K. HALL, supra. note 6, at 6-7. In discussing legal culture as a manifestation of
ideology, for example, Hall singles out the ideas of "prominent figures in the legal
system." Id. at 6.
35. Id.
36. Even within the law box, Hall defines the realm of the cultural very narrowly. For
example, The Magic Mirror does not contain one word on literature. On the crucial

cultural configuration of law and letters in America, see R. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS
(1984); Konefsky, Law and Culture in Antebellum Boston, 40 STAN.
L. REV. 1119 (1988). See also P. MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA: FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR (1965).
IN AMERICAN CULTURE

37. K. HALL, supra note 6, at 211. As far as I can establish, the words "legal culture"
appear only twice, both times incidentally, in the first ten chapters of The Magic Mirror.
Id. at 27, 127.
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three component elements of the legal system interact. 38 As he
puts it, "Legal culture through ideology and interest provides
the mainsprings of the legal system in the United States. Structure and substance provide the institutional manifestations of the
system; legal culture embodies the motivating forces in response
to which the other two develop."3 9 When we get right down to
it, however, the single mainspring of interest far outweighs all
other considerations. "Our legal history reflects back to us generations of pragmatic decision making rather than a quest for
ideological purity and consistency. Personal and group interests
have always ordered the course of legal development; instrumen40
talism has been the way of the law.."
This Friedmanesque conclusion contradicts Hall's introductory
call for greater analytic appreciation of the law's autonomy. Hall
attempts to avoid the contradiction, however, by the invocation
of a fourth component of the legal system, namely "the rule of
law" itself.41 In effect, this is the magic in the mirror. Hall sees
the rule of law represented in American culture as a principle
set apart, autonomous of specifiable legal events, and "one of the
great forces in the history of western civilization" that proposes
to make "all persons equal before a neutral and impartial authority. '42 The rule of law derives its legitimacy from "the possibility of applying it on a reasoned basis free from the whim
and caprice of both individuals and government," independent of
considerations of "[s]ocial position, governmental office, family of
birth, wealth, and race." 43 In the American context, as Hall
describes it, the rule of law ideal is the keystone of cultural
consensus in a society otherwise dominated by centrifugal interests. 44 Far more than a tool in the hands of the most powerfulHall is critical of those who take such an approach 4 5-the rule of

38. Id. at 4-7. Indeed, Hall characterizes the book as "a synthesis of American legal
culture." Id. at viii.
39. Id. at 6.
40. Id. at 335.
41. Id. at 6.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 7.
45. Id. at 6-7. Here, he names "scholars identified with the critical legal studies
movement" who "complain that the law merely provided a formal device by which the
most powerful elements of a capitalist society-the ruling class-perpetuated their
control." Id. at 7. As Robert Gordon, among others, has pointed out, such a characterization
misunderstands Critical Legal Studies (CLS) scholarship. See Gordon & Nelson, An
Exchange on CriticalLegal Studies Between Robert W. Gordon and William Nelson, 6 LAW
& HIST. REv. 139, 144-54 (1988) [hereinafter Gordon & Nelson, Exchange]. I return to this
point below. See infra notes 61-62, 257-60.
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law's enduring symbolic effectiveness is consequential upon the
legal system's responsiveness to all interests. That response has
often fallen short, Hall acknowledges, 46 but never so far or so
fundamentally as to call the ideal into question. Hence, the rule
of law remains a determinate normative standard, a frontier of
right action. When people behave in ways4 of which we disapprove,
we say they have stepped outside of it. 7
This account of Hall's conceptualization of his task suggests
that there is more to The Magic Mirror's theorization of legal
historical writing than immediately meets the eye. In seeking to
elucidate "the main lines of development in American legal culture,' ' 48 Hall cleaves strongly to a traditional liberal position,
embracing on the one hand a jurisprudentially positivist conception of "law" as an official discourse emanating from governing
institutions, 49 and on the other a conception of the rule of law as
an autonomous and transhistorical ideal that safeguards us from
oppression, not least the oppression of those same institutions. 0
Governing institutions' responsiveness over the long term to the
basic needs of all citizens entrenches the rule of law in American
culture and ensures the continuing loyalty of the citizenry to
51
those institutions.
My own opinion is that this theoretical stance, largely implicit
though it is, is not helpful to the task of furthering either the
general project of legal history or Hall's own exciting project of
writing a history of American legal culture. What it has led to
here, for example, is better described as a history of the American
legal system.52 Legal culture does not coincide in extent and

46. See, e.g., K. HALL, supra note 6, at 188, 265.
47. Id. at 56, 335.
48. Id. at vii.
49. Thus, law in America is "a system of social choice . . . in which government
provides for the allocation of resources, the legitimate use of violence, and the structuring
of social relationships," and to write the history of that law is to write "the history of
legal institutions broadly conceived." Id. at vii, 89.
50. Id- at 6-7.
51. Id. Thus, "[tihe rule of law in American history has made possible widespread
economic and political power, and the long-term trend has been toward the greater
dissemination of both, as the evolving legal history of blacks and women suggests." Id.
at 335.
52. Hall's conclusions in fact treat "legal system" and "legal culture" as virtual synonyms. Id. at 334-36. Elsewhere, Hall's writings confirm that he sees the culture concept
primarily as providing a foundation upon which to write a history integrating facets of
the legal system-notably public law and private law-that official legal discourse ordinarily treats as distinct. See Hall, The Magic Mirror:American Constitutional and Legal
History, 1 INT'L J. SOC. EDUC. 22, 39-40 (1986) [hereinafter Hall, American Constitutional
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limits with official institutions and ideologies any more than the
party system defines the realm of politics. Contemporary scholarship already realizes this, 3 and it will become clearer as more
historians turn to search out the diversity of legal cultures that
exist at any one time, and at different times, in a society. 4 The
more this process continues, the more the identification of law
as a discursive monopoly of official institutions -that is, of the
state-will be recognized as a historical problem that scholars
should explain, rather than a common point of departure that
55
scholars can assume.
The multiplicity of legal ideas and settings that the uncovering
of multiple legal cultures implies also controverts rule-of-law
ideology's imputation of an objectively determinate content to
law and hence the representation of the rule of law as a per se
normative standard of behavior. Robert Gordon has argued, "Llaw
is indeterminate at its core, in its inception, not just in its
applications. This indeterminacy exists because legal rules derive
from structures of thought, the collective constructs of many
minds, that are fundamentally contradictory. 56 Having recognized the infinite range of contributing consciousnesses, however,
we must go on to explain how some legal discourses at some
points in time become privileged whereas others are rendered
oppositional or ignored altogether. 57 Such a project ought to be

and Legal History]. Difficulties in obtaining a copy of this piece through conventional
channels leave me very much indebted to Professor Hall for his courtesy in making a
copy available to me himself.
53. See supra note 33.
54. I do not wish to be understood as saying here that Hall fails to recognize plurality
in legal culture as a significant phenomenon in American history. He does recognize this.
But he confines that insight by defining it almost entirely in jurisdictional and regional
terms. See, e.g., K. HALL, supra note 6, at vii-viii. For a rare hint of recognition of plural
legal cultures as social phenomena, see his comments on ethnicity, crime, and the criminal
justice system. Id. at 255. Even here, however, the talk is of plural moralities rather
than plural legalities. Id. For additional hints, see Hail, The "Magic Mirror" and the
Promise of Western Legal History at the Bicentennial of the Constitution, 18 W. HIST. Q.
429 (1987).
55. Ideally, this process will bring to fruition in American history a theorization of law
that, 15 years ago, was described as "only just beginning," namely what the Italian
historiographer Arnaldo Momigliano described in 1963 as conceiving "history of law" as
"a formulation of human relations rooted in manifold human activities." Gordon, supra
note 9, at 9 (quoting A. MOMIGLIANO, The Consequences of New Trends in the History of

Ancient Law, in

STUDIES IN HISTORIOGRAPHY

239, 24041 (1966)). Momigliano continued:

"And if, in some civilizations, there is a class of jurisconsults with special rules of conduct
and of reasoning, this too is a social phenomenon to be interpreted." Id.
56. Gordon, CriticalLegal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 114 (1984).
57. See id. at 120-24; supra note 32. Gordon notes the importance of the task without,
however, doing much here to address it.
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part of Hall's goal of delineating the main lines of development
in American legal culture. But Hall's focus on the formal system,
his evolutionary perspective, and his conception of the rule of
law all discount any perspective .that treats law as a stew of
multiple and contradictory discourses, some sanctioned, some
not.5 To explore law in these terms requires that we expand the
objects of legal history well beyond the delineation of conditions
sustaining or infringing upon the rule of law and establish instead
the characteristics of the law that becomes the modality of rule.5 9
Unwillingness to entertain such an expansion hinders Hall in
his quest to give real meaning to that "genuinely elusive" 60
concept of legal culture with which he desires to concern himself.
I do not attribute this unwillingness to any innate scholarly
blindness on Hall's part. Rather, I believe the problem is more
concern lest, as a result of such expansion, the curse of critical
61
scholarship undermine the liberal legal rule of law he avows.
In this he is by no means alone. 62 Unfortunately, to crack this
mirror's code requires that one take risks. One must, so to speak,
63
dare to look down to Camelot.

58. Gordon has commented that legal writers
sometimes restrict their view of what law is to a bunch of discrete events
that occur within certain specialized state agencies. . . and therefore assume
that the only question for a social history of law is the relation between the
output of these agencies and social change. But if that output is all there is
to law, how on earth are we going to characterize all the innumerable rights,
duties, privileges, and immunities that people commonly recognize and enforce without officials anywhere nearby?
Gordon, supra note 56, at 107.
59. I have made one such attempt. See Tomlins, Law, Police and the PursuitofHappiness
in the New American Republic, 4 STUD. AM. POL. DEv. 3 (1990). For perspectives on this
theoretical turn, see Diamond, Not-So-CriticalLegal Studies, 6 CARDoZo L. REV. 693 (1985);
Hunt, The Critique of Law: What is 'Critical' about CriticalLegal Theory?, 14 J. L. &
Soc'y 5 (1987); Hunt, The Ideology of Law: Advances and Problems in Recent Applications
of the Concept of Ideology to the Analysis of Law, 19 L. & Soc'y REV. 11 (1985; Trubek &
Esser, "CriticalEmpiricism" in American Legal Studies: Paradox,Program or Pandora's
Box?, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 3 (1989).
60. K. HALL, supra note 6, at 6.
61. Hall's distaste for the "critical legal" historians who have made liberal legalism an
object of criticism is displayed mutedly in K. HALL, supra note 6, at 6-7, and more openly
in Hall, American Constitutional and Legal History, supra note 52, at 37-39. See also infra
notes 258-61 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Gordon & Nelson, Exchange, supra note 45, at 165-68, 184-85 (Nelson). This
exchange arose as a consequence of Nelson's earlier assessment of CLS in THE LITERATURE
OF AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY

(W. Nelson & J. Reid eds. 1985). It is fair to say, I think,

that Hall agrees with Nelson's assessment in all essentials. See K.
at 6-7.

63. See A.

TENNYSON,

supra note 1.

HALL,

supra note 6,
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LINES OF SIGHT

And moving thro' a mirror clear
That hangs before her all the year,
Shadows of the world appear.
There she sees the highway near
Winding down to Camelot:
There the river eddy whirls,
And there the surly village-churls,
And the red cloaks of market girls,
Pass onward from Shalott. 4
What follows in this Section is, in essence, a synopsis of Hall's
account of law in American history, together with some comments
specific to elements of that account. Notwithstanding the shortcomings that I have argued exist in Hall's conceptualization, I
want to underline that I regard his account as an important
contribution. Not only does it comprise the only thorough survey
of four centuries of legal development currently available, but it
also seeks always to contextualize those dynamics by setting
them in wider historical currents. Hall's text, one might say, sits
on the drawbridge between legal and general historiography and
offers pointers to scholars passing in each direction. This is a
strategic position to aspire to, and the book's comprehensiveness
will no doubt ensure that it remains a useful source of traffic
advisories for quite some time.
A.

The Colonial and Revolutionary Periods

Hall rather slights the colonial period. We move from the
earliest days of the seventeenth century to the Revolution in a
brisk forty pages, 65 after which the pace slows considerably as
Hall traces the developments of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries in meticulous detail. Nonetheless, the early chapters
usefully establish major, albeit familiar, themes, notably those of
pragmatism, adaptation, and diversity. Far from "receiving" the
common law en bloc, early migrants carried with them a body of
legal ideas which they applied pragmatically across a range of
settings varying widely in climate, geography, and settlement
pattern.6 6 This diversity of setting and application reinforced the

64. Id.
65. K. HALL, supra note 6, at 9-48.
66. Id. at 12-14.
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the legitimation of market activity and of market measures of
efficient resource allocation.84
Importantly, Hall does not regard this new market system as
a legally constituted phenomenon 8 5 Rather, he represents markets as the institutional expression of the cumulated autonomous
decisions that private economic actors have taken in their own
interests.8 6 From this perspective, the primary social significance
of market legitimation lay in its transfer of a substantial element
of control over the distribution of economic rights away from
legal institutions, relocating it in the agreements reached among
private individuals87 Hall recognizes that lawmakers do in fact
act in ways that influence market outcomes, but he sees this as
a process of imposition on markets in order to modify their
otherwise autonomous operation.as Hall formulates the process as
one of "intervention" in the private marketplace through legislative and judicial action distributing costs, benefits, and risks of
economic growth to serve the public interest in economic development and otherwise to protect the "rights of the public." 89

84. Id. at 88.

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 88, 95-96.
88. Id. at 88-89.
89. Id. at 89. An alternative, and in my opinion more satisfactory, approach is to think
of markets, just like all other social institutions, as legally constituted phenomena. As
Robert Steinfeld stated, to think of the historical process of free market formation as
one of "liberation of self interested individuals from traditional legal and communal
constraints"-that is, as a process of legallgovernmental withdrawal-is to ignore how
the process of free market formation "inevitably made necessary collective [which is to
say legal/governmental] choices about whose and what kinds of freedom would be legally
privileged and whose and what kinds of freedom would be legally restricted." Steinfeld,
The Struggle Over Alternative Legal Constructions of a Free Market in Labor: the Philadelphia Cordwainers' Case of 1806, in LABOR LAW INAMERICA: HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL
ESSAYS 1, 1, 3 (C. Tomlins & A. King eds.) (rev. ed. Nov. 15, 1990) (forthcoming). There
is nothing necessitarian or essentialist about this alternative way of conceiving markets;
the rules creating the "coercive power which pervades 'free' markets . . .give different
shapes to that power depending upon which particular ones are chosen." Id. at 4. It
merely involves recognition that the institution of the market is constituted by the legal
choices made and is not a naturally occurring phenomenon. "The deliberate collective
choices involved are unavoidable-the 'free' market is simply not self-defining." Id. at 5.
Hence, it is inaccurate to conceptualize the interaction of law and economy along a
spectrum of nonintervention/intervention or distribution/redistribution; all possible economies represent institutions constituted by the choice of combinations of different kinds
of legal rules.
Peter Oxenbridge Thacher provided a fine example of judicial conceptualization of
markets in precisely these terms in the course of a charge to the Suffolk County grand
jury at the opening of the December 1832 session of the Boston Municipal Court:
All who are engaged in trade, commerce, manufactures, the mechanic arts,
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As we already know, courts were deeply involved in the
creative explosion, and their "americanization" of the common
law 90 brought major changes in any number of doctrinal areas:
corporations, property, contract, tort, labor. 91 Here also, "privatization" is Hall's principal theme. 92 These activities underline
the extent to which, as Morton Horwitz argued, courts took on
a self-conscious role as economic policymaking institutions. 93 Hall
acknowledges Horwitz's contribution, but criticizes his contention
that the transformation of American law that took place during
these years served the wealthy at others' expense. 94 The judiciary
may have "facilitated economic development through legal instrumentalism, but it clung to the idea that the public enjoyed
certain rights that it was required to protect. . . .Even in cases
involving labor, the judiciary accepted that unionization was not
a criminal activity." 95 Hall also criticizes Horwitz for discounting

agriculture, and the learned professions, all, in every varied pursuit of
industry and talent, may freely contend together for profit in pursuit of
their respective good. But the operations of society cannot proceed, unless
the law, which, like the air, is over every thing, and pervades every thing,
and is the life of every thing, protect, in full extent, the principle of equal
and fair competition.
Tomlins, Criminal Conspiracy and Early Labor Combinations:Massachusetts, 1824-1840,

28

LAB. HIST.

370, 384 (1987).

90. K. HALL, supra note 6, at 109.
91. Id. at 106-26.
92. Id. In corporations law, for example, courts repudiated the claim that all corporations were inherently public because the state chartered them to fulfill social responsibilities. Id. at 111. In the area of property, courts promoted private economic activity by
liberating actors from the restraints of antidevelopmental doctrines, stressing instead
"the efficient use of resources based on competition," id. at 114, while in contract, "will
theory" made perhaps the most potent of common law contributions to the privatization
of economic decisionmaking by turning the law from a mechanism for court-supervised
transfers of title into a means for enforcing private agreements in a market of fungible
goods. Id. at 120. Tort law saw the erosion of strict liability standards, the development
of the fault principle, and, in industrial accidents, the fellow-servant rule that made the
extent of an employer's liability a creature purely of private agreement between employee
and employer. Id at 123-26. Finally, in the area of labor, courts modified the use of
criminal conspiracy doctrine against unions, believing that benefits "might accrue from
the contest between unions and employers." Id. at 113-14.
93. M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977).
94. K. HALL, supra note 6, at 127-28.
95. Id. at 127. Public rights is a broad and important concept that certainly offers
scope for judicial action countervailing the contest of private interests and the ascendancy
of the powerful over the weak. Usually, however, courts looked at "public rights" in
terms of a more particular reading-the public right to an efficient use of resources
through the facilitation of a competitive market economy-that mobilized public rights
as a countervailing doctrine only to a limited extent. No doubt such a definition was a
legitimate reading of "public right," but one can also imagine other equally legitimate
readings. For some sense of the variety of available definitions of "public rights" and of
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jurisdictional discontinuities created by migration into widely
separated colonies and resulted in the creation not of a unified
67
system, but of a series of legal systems.
Diversity was not unalloyed, and Hall also stresses sources of
uniformity in the colonial legal tradition: a migrant population
relatively homogenous in socioeconomic origins, common acceptance of notions of a higher law, and an early turn toward
68
codification which gave law a "consensual, rational" appearance.
The development in all colonies of active legislative bodies based
on an extensive franchise further reinforced respect for law,
culminating in "the eventual acceptance of a popular will theory
of law. That is, legitimate law had to be derived from the
69
people."
The themes of jurisdictional diversity, legitimacy through adaptation, and consensual lawmaking establish an interpretive
foundation for the rest of the book. The Magic Mirror does not
ignore social conflict, but it does not highlight it as a dynamic
developmental influence. A case in point is the Revolution, "an
ambiguous affair as revolutions go." 70 Egalitarian rhetoric notwithstanding, antagonism to a hierarchical social order did not
drive the Revolution's development. Rather, it was a war for
jurisdictional independence, stimulated by "[t]he forces of acquisitive capitalism and the Enlightenment's emphasis on individual
reason and human worth," animated by the idea of the rule of
law, and important historically in that it cleared the stage for
America's nineteenth-century surge of legal experimentation while
simultaneously establishing the foundations for a modern "constitutional consciousness" that emphasized the limitations of governmental power.7'1
B. Law in the New Republic
Left unclear at the end of the Revolutionary decade were the
precise relationships that would pertain between the key constituent elements of the new order: the rule of law and popular
will, judiciaries and legislatures, and the federal government and
the states. Hall sees this set of relationships as defined during

67. Id. at 13-14.

68. Id. at 15.
69. Id at 17.
70. Id. at 49.
71. Id. at 49-50, 57-58.
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the period of 1787-1815.72 Hall focusses in particular on Federalist
ambitions to resort to central institutions to impose their vision
of the public good, using the federal courts along the way to
"6coerce political stability" 73 and Jeffersonian fears of a federal
judiciary out to destroy both popular politics and, through judicial
review and a federal common law, state sovereignty. 74 While
"radicals" inveighed against lawyers and the common law in
general, "moderate" Jeffersonians sought reform that would curb
Federalist excesses while preserving the courts' capacity to check
popular will.75 The moderates' triumph after 1801 settled the new
Republic's first major political crisis and created the conditions
for establishing the "truly hybrid legal system" from which the
subsequent revolution in substantive law emerged. 76 Federal judicial power was not inhibited and "substantial discretion" was
77
also retained at the local level championed by the radicals.
Moderate Jeffersonians, however, gave the legal system "a decidedly state-centered cast.."78 State appellate courts enjoyed great
authority to interpret the substantive common law and complemented state legislatures that retained a full quota of police
powers through which to realize the rights of the community at
large.79 This division of legal labor "fixed the most critical decisions about the allocation of economic resources and social policy
before the Civil War in the states."8 0
In the explosion of decisionmaking that followed, Hall argues,
state legislatures and courts turned away from "the ethical yardstick" that their colonial predecessors employed. 81 Without altogether abandoning earlier commitments to the policing of economic
behavior, legislatures came to concentrate much more fully on
the promotion of economic activity. 82 Similarly, judges began
concentrating on "how legal rules encouraged economic growth,
individual risk taking, and the accumulation of capital." The
result was the privatization of economic decisionmaking.through

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

67-68.
77.
76-77.
78-79. Hall does not define the terms "radical" and "moderate."
86.

at 109.
at 95-96.
at 109.
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the centrality of the rule of law in American culture and cites
John Phillip Reid's study of migrants on the overland trail 6 The
migrants were well beyond the reach of legal authority, yet they
97
behaved "in ways that underscored their law-abiding nature."

the contest among them at this time, see L. HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC
THOUGHT: PENNSYLVANIA, 1776-1860 (1948).
The particular example cited, Lemuel Shaw's "decriminalization" of unions in Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842), bears out this comment, for Shaw grounded
the decision on the competitive marketplace principle that the maximization of opportunities to pursue self-interest maximized the good of all. Id. at 127-34. Maximization of
opportunity implying no inherent limitations on the form in which opportunity might be
pursued, when interests were held sufficiently in common to warrant collective rather
than individual pursuit of them, associations might be created for their pursuit through
the same contractual devices that constituted all forms of social relation. Id. Thus, in the
instant case "we cannot perceive, that it is criminal for men to agree together to exercise
their own acknowledged rights, in such a manner as best to subserve their own interests."
Id at 130.
The measure of acceptability of any species of human behavior having become its
tendency to contribute to the reproduction of a competitive marketplace society, pursuit
of self-interest, either singly or-through a self-constituted association-collectively, was
legitimate even if it proved to be injurious to another, as long as, but only as long as, it
was perceived to be congruent with the principle of competition and its contractual
incidents. Because injurious outcomes might result from socially beneficial actions, the
mere fact of an injurious outcome was not sufficient to justify condemnation of the
behavior that led to it. At the same time, given that society had no existence apart from
the myriad of individual transactions, any injury was potentially socially deleterious.
Hence, the legality of an injurious outcome would be judged by the end sought or, in
cases in which the end was judged laudable or meritorious or public spirited, by the
means used. Id. at 128-31.
To some extent the decision in Hunt is congruent with both of Hall's themes. It was
a privatization of the issue of combination, turning it from what had been primarily a
confrontation between working people and the courts over the legitimacy of labor
organizations in the postrevolutionary polity into a matter of industrial relations-a
conflict between working people and their employers over the degree of control each
would exercise at the point of production that the courts would arbitrate. In addition, it
invoked the public interest in justification. But Hunt decriminalized unions only within
the narrow realm of a "competitive market" reading of public rights and did nothing to
erode the courts' continued command over the determination of the degree of criminality
to be read in the intentions or actions of associated workmen. In the industrial struggles
that became endemic during the second half of the nineteenth century, the courts' use
of criminal conspiracy proved devastating. See, e.g., Hattam, supra note 8.
For a more developed discussion of these points, see C. TOMLINS, THE PURSUIT OF
HAPPINESS: LAW, LABOR AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC ch. 5 (rev. ed. Nov. 15,
1990) (unpublished manuscript).

96. J. REID,

LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT: PROPERTY AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR ON THE OVERLAND

TRAIL (1980).
97. K. HALL, supra note 6, at 128. Hall does not make the point of his criticism
completely clear, but it appears to be that migrant displays of respect for property rights
and equanimity in settling disputes under extreme conditions demonstrate consensual
adherence to a rule-of-law mentality in American culture, and that the apparent absence
of popular alienation from the law gives the lie to Horwitz's contention of bias. In fact,
however, Reid's account is not necessarily incompatible with Horwitz's at all. Horwitz's
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C. Slavery, Domestic Relations, and Criminal Justice
Yet in some cases, it seems, legal ideology could indeed mask
unconscionable outcomes. For example, southern appellate judges
confronting slavery used the common law tradition as "a mask
that concealed their humanity and that of the slaves."95 Northern
judges too "pulled on the masks of the law and resorted to a
highly formal approach to issues of personal status, morality, and
race" when confronting slavery.9 9 Nor did this dissembling cease

subject was the judiciary's role during the first half of the nineteenth century in creating
dynamic and developmentally facilitative doctrinal rules in areas of law-contract, property, and tort-in which prevailing doctrine had not been facilitative. His normative gloss
on this process was that it was a project that undermined preindustrial communal customs
and ties, one undertaken more in the interests of the wealthy and powerful seeking
opportunities for capital accumulation and profit than in the interests of the citizenry at
large. Reid's description of the concept of property operative among migrants on the
overland trail-essentially one of absolute right-shows that it bore little resemblance
to contemporary property doctrine, which both Hall and Horwitz would agree had by the
1840's become dynamic, flexible, and, in matters of owners' rights, contingent upon
fulfilling the developmental imperative. See, e.g., id. at 114-19; M. HORWITZ, supra note
93, at 31-62. Further, Reid stresses the rootedness of the migrants' concept of property
in the custom and experience of the eastern, predominantly New England communities
from which they came, describing these areas as "an agrestic, community-centered world
we have lost." J. REID, supra note 96, at 362. In these respects, Reid's story is good
evidence for the existence of a gulf between the concept of property current on the trail
and (apparently) in eastern agrarian communities, and the legal-doctrinal concept of
property current in the decisions and opinions of the mid-nineteenth-century bench and
bar. The existence of such a gulf supports Horwitz's account rather than detracts from
it.
Reid's account actually has more critical implications for Hall than for Horwitz. One of
the main points of Reid's book is that the culture of property on the overland trail was
a legal culture:
A pattern of behavior based on mutual expectations concerning duties and
rights may as accurately be labeled "legal" behavior as may behavior dictated
by fear of police enforcement. What [the migrants'] words and conduct tell
us is that for nineteenth-century Americans the definition of binding "law,"
vesting rights and imposing obligations, was not limited to a command or
set of commands from the "sovereign" backed by threats or by force. Nor
was "law" some abstraction discovered or justified by appealing to "natural"
or universal rules of ideal deportment. Law was the taught, learned, accepted
customs of a people.
Id. at 361-62. As we have seen, Hall's own definitions of "law" and "legal culture" are
narrower, much more positivist, and more limiting. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
(Reid, of course, gives his account a gloss of its own, one essentially based on the claim
that because the culture of property can be rendered in legal terminology by an observer,
there is in fact no difference between an implicitly holistic "law" and the legal culture
of the trail. Because the latter can be characterized in the terminology of the former,
the former must be the source of the latter. This is precisely where his book is weakest.
But this is not a review of Law For the Elephant.)
98. K. HALL, supra note 6, at 134.
99. Id. at 141.
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until Chief Justice Taney's brutally explicit appraisal of the
constitutional status of slavery and the slave in Dred Scott v.
Sandford'0 0 simply left no more room for maneuver.
What Taney did in Dred Scott, of course, was hold that the
Constitution was constitutive of the racial and physical subordination of African-Americans. 101 The postwar corollary was constitutional amendments and legislative enactments that altered
the legal conditions of that subordination. Hall argues that in
this process racism acted as a brake on the otherwise "unparalleled opportunity" for legal reform.'0 2 It is not clear to me whether
this means that the legal culture was endemically racist or was
inhibited by the racism endemic in American culture at large.
Similar questions emerge from Hall's analysis of nineteenthcentury domestic relations law. 0 3 Here, Hall ascribes a transformation in the traditional American family underway during the
nineteenth century to the "ideological and economic forces that
flowed from the American Revolution,'. 0 4 a transformation moderated by an emergent family law grounded in the "persistent
belief that the private family was the foundation of national
morality" and assuring "continuity within change."'0 5 But are the
values to which the law lends continuity ascribable to the general
culture, which is apparently changing in directions eroding patriarchy, or to the legal culture, which apparently acts to maintain
06
patriarchy? Hall describes the Constitution as gender-neutral'
and appears to imply that legal values are not gendered-that
gender discrimination, like racism, is a societal phenomenon which
imposes itself on the legal culture.'07 Others have disagreed,
however, 10 8 and Hall's closing statement-that "It]he end of traditional patriarchy only meant that a new judicial patriarchy
grew to replace it"109-is equivocal in that it is susceptible to
either interpretation.

100.
101.
102.
racism
103.
104.

60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
Id. at 399-454.
K. HALL, supra note 6, at 143; see also id. at 145 (Hall argues that "itihe embedded
of the Reconstruction era limited the scope of social change through the law.").
Id. at 150-67.
Id. at 150.

105. Id.
106. Id. at 327.
107. See id. at 327-29.
108. See, e.g., S. LEBSOCK, supra note 33; Minow, supra note 33; see also Finley,
Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86
COLm. L. REV. 1118 (1986).
109. K. HALL, supra note 6, at 152.
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Apart from these asides, Hall's narrative of nineteenth-century
domestic relations law is in fact a chronicle less of continuity
amid change than of an ascending curve of state activity transforming the family and the relationships among its members.
According to Hall, "the traditional private contractual basis of
marriage" became subject to licensing to regulate the fitness of
prospective marriage partners. 110 Legislators also took steps to
reform married women's property rights, restrict the dissemination of birth control information, outlaw abortion, and regulate
the adoption of children."' Such developments accelerated dramatically in intensity after the Civil War. It is not immediately
clear why, for Hall's basic explanation for legal activity in this
area-concern with the impact of market capitalism on the
family 2 -- is not temporally refined enough to explain the clear
rhythms in state activity that his narrative uncovers.
Hall's exposition of developments in criminal law follows, in
broad outline, his narrative of domestic relations law." 3 Again,
the "powerful forces of market capitalism and individualism"
unleashed by the Revolution provide the dynamic." 4 And again,
what emerges most clearly from the chronicle is a rising curve
of state activity in the second half of the nineteenth century, as
criminal regulation of moral behavior (such as abortion and gambling) and public order offenses (notably vagrancy 5) rejoined the
early nineteenth century's emphasis on economic crime 16 in mu17
tual dedication to the achievement of social order and control.
By 1900, innovations in penal policy and policing during the
second half of the century had created the broad outlines of the
modern criminal justice system." 8 Hall finds, however, that the
persistence of traditions of popular control and local decision-

110. Id. at 155.
111. Id. at 158-64.
112. Id. at 150-51.
113. Id. at 168-88.
114. Id. at 169.
115. Id. at 185. Hall does not make the connection, but fascinating parallels exist
between the development of a race-based statutory law of involuntary labor in the postCivil War South and a non-race-based statutory law of involuntary labor aimed at vagrants
in the North. See Stanley, The Underside of Contract Freedom: Obliging the Beggar to
Labor, in LABOR LAW IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL ESSAYS (C. Tomlins & A.
King eds.) (rev. ed. Nov. 15, 1990) (forthcoming).
116. This emphasis was attributable to "the economic forces of the Revolution" that
"placed great value on holding and using private property for individual gain." K. HALL,
supra note 6, at 169.
117. Id. at 185.
118. Id. at 187.
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making inhibited the development of the order, routine, and
efficiency that the description "criminal justice system" implies."19
Although Hall stresses elsewhere the importance of jurisdictional
diversity and popular will to consensual, and therefore legitimate,
governing authority, when it comes to criminal justice he implies
a continuing problem
that popular and decentralized control pose
120
for public order and "the rule of law.'
D. The New Regulatory State
The substantive thrust of criminal law in the direction of
explicit social regulation 121 was congruent with larger trends in
the relationship between law and American society and economy. 22 As Hall presents it, the legal history of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries is principally the familiar story of
a transition from a distributive to a regulatory state.'2 Drawing
on recent work in political history, 2 4 Hall relates distributive
outcomes during the nineteenth century to a distinctive institutional structure that placed political parties at the center of local
and national lawmaking.'2 Rapid urbanization and industrialization, however, generated demands from new social groups on a
scale that the established party system could not accommodate.' 26
The result was a proliferation of third parties and social reform
movements urging new views of law and legal institutions "designed to serve disaffected social constituencies."'12
The most prominent of these movements were the predominantly agrarian populists, who were strongest in the South and

119. Id.
120. Id. at 176-85, 187-88, passim.
121. Hall writes that over the course of the nineteenth century, "the purposes of
criminal law shifted from punishment to regulation of antisocial behavior." Id. at 187.
Insofar as to be an African-American or a woman outside one's appropriate sociocultural
location was to engage in antisocial behavior, one might suggest that the law both of
domestic and of race relations in the second half of the nineteenth century had attained
a similar purpose. See id.
122. See id. at 189-210.
123. Id. at 190.
124. See, e.g., R. MCCORMICK, THE PARTY PERIOD AND PUBLIC POLICY: AMERICAN POLITICS
FROM THE AGE OF JACKSON TO THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1986).

125. K. HALL, supranote 6, at 195. "The parties aggregated the electorate and organized
governmental functions, most notably the legislatures, which distributed resources and
privileges to individuals and groups. In return, these groups rewarded their chosen party
at the polls." Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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West, and the predominantly urban and middle class progressives. 1 Both groups sought a far more regulatory role from
government. 129 Crucially, however, they represented otherwise
very distinct approaches to the relationship between politics and
government. Progressives advanced a general critique of partisan
politics not shared by the populists and an ideology of efficiency
in public life-government by authoritative experts and a "disposition of calculation" in public policy. 130 Progressive ascendancy
after the turn of the century brought these new methods of
government into being, increasing the penetration of law and
legal institutions into everyday life while simultaneously diluting
politics, eroding popular participation, and making government
more responsive to well-organized economic interests, "a pattern
that continued to develop through the twentieth century.' 131 Hall
offers a typically guarded evaluation of these processes, finding
in progressivism an "only partly unrealized [promise] that impar1 32
tial experts would solve problems on a neutral, scientific basis.'
E.

The Judiciary and the Regulatory State

Legal-historical scholarship has given considerable attention to
the judiciary's role in the emerging regulatory state of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.'3 Hall argues that the
stereotypical portrayal of that role stresses judicial obstruction
of regulatory initiatives, but that by and large the historical
record does not justify any such conclusion. 13 4 Courts, it is true,
became far more active players in the formulation of public policy,
but their involvement reflected the growing incidence of legislative regulation and the consequent increase in demand on the
appellate judiciary for interpretation and review. 13 5 Although
critics fearful of popular majorities pressed courts to restrain
legislative authority, courts in most instances supported federal
36
and state legislative initiatives.

128. Id. at 195-97.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 195-97, 203.
131. Id. at 196.
132. Id. at 210.
133. For a recent example, which stresses the "unique centrality" of the courts in the
structure of the American state, see Forbath, supra note 8, at 1235-36.
134. K. HALL, supra note 6, at 226.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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When courts did strike down regulatory legislation, the doctrine most often used in justification was that of substantive due
process. 137 "Substantive due process meant that there existed an
irreducible sum of rights that vested in the individual and with
which government could not arbitrarily interfere."'1 Though substantive due process traditionally has been seen as an expression
of a judicial desire to protect the wealthy from regulatory legislation redistributing the costs of economic development, Hall
argues that in fact it was far more often used to strike down
special legislation that gave particular advantages to one interest
over another. 139 Therefore, although decisions invoking the doctrine undeniably "had the distributive consequence of favoring
capital," historians also should understand those decisions as
140
affirming "individual rights over special privilege."'
Although the results belie the claim that courts granted little
leeway to legislatures in matters of economic regulation, there
is no denying that "the judiciary clung to the notion that they
had a special responsibility to protect traditional economic
rights"'' and fashioned doctrines such as substantive due process
as the means to that end. 4 2 Retreating from the antebellum
period's "flexible, adaptive, and freewheeling view of the law" as
a result-oriented instrument, judges came instead to emphasize
the "formal procedures that led to a result.' 4' This jurispruden-

137. Id. at 232.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., State v. Santee, 111 Iowa 1, 82 N.W. 445 (1900) (Iowa law privileged one
lamp manufacturer over all others).
140. K. HALL, supra note 6, at 234-35, 238. Hall claims that the contrast between
historical perception and judicial behavior is particularly acute in the case of protective
and labor legislation. Id. Historians have generally concluded that state and federal courts
savaged legislatures' police power efforts to redistribute the costs of industrialization
through protective legislation for women, children, and hazardous occupations. Hall differs:
Freedom to contract was the major constitutional hurdle that all protective
legislation had to negotiate. The results of sustained judicial inquiry produced
the same results as in the economic regulation cases: judges in a few
spectacular instances . . . overturned legislation, but in the vast majority of
cases they left these measures and the police powers upon which they rested
intact. Only in matters involving unions were the courts consistently hostile.
Id. at 238. Hall's contention, however, attracts no support from the most recent comprehensive research in this field. William Forbath has shown that between 1885 and 1900,
American courts struck down 35 protective and labor laws and upheld only 7, and that
"by 1920 courts had struck down roughly three hundred labor laws." Forbath, supra note
8, at 1132-48, 1237-48.
141. K. HALL, supra note 6, at 246.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 221.
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tial formalism was antilegislative in its implications and clearly
sympathetic to judicial review. 144 Nevertheless, formalism did not
lead to a wholesale supplanting of legislative authority. Moreover,
"judges began to recognize that extrajudicial materials could be
useful in understanding the intentions of legislators and in coming
to grips with the social implications of the law in action."145 This
recognition, embodied in sociological jurisprudence and associated
with the rise of progressivism and its attempts to create a
bureaucratic administrative state of scientific experts, began to
make inroads on the formalist position in the years after 1900.146
F.

Legal Culture, Professionalization,and CulturalPluralism

The significance of the interpretive contest between formalism
and sociological jurisprudence was heightened because processes
of professionalization accompanying law's structural and substantive transformation in the years after 1860 greatly enhanced the
authoritative voice of both bench and bar in public discourse on
law. By 1920, the legal profession had emerged in its modern
form as arbiter of a body of scientific rules-"the 'new high
147
priests' of an increasingly legalistic, industrialized society."'
Hall describes this "professionalization of the legal culture" by
reference to the formalization of occupational qualifications, the
growth in scale and transformed organization of law practice, the
creation of professional organizations at state and national levels,
and the transformation of legal edhcation, all processes under
way during the period of 1860-1920.148 Like previous writers,
notably Jerold Auerbach,'49 Hall recognizes that the desires of
elite lawyers to reinforce their position and influence in a chang-

144. Id. at 221-22. "Appellate judges were supposed to be oracular, to propound
impartially a set body of doctrine. When legislative activity, carried out in the name of
popular and partisan majorities, interfered with formal legal doctrine, then judges were
supposed to strike it down mechanically." Id.
145. Id. at 246.
146. Id. at 223.
147. Id. at 225.
148. Id. at 211-25, passim. Hall's discussion of professionalism draws conceptually on
B. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM: THE MIDDLE CLASS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA (1976). For a more skeptical account, see M.
LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977). See also M.
POWELL, FROM PATRICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL ELITE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE NEW

YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION (1988). R. ABEL, THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN ENGLAND AND
WALES 3-31 (1988), provides an excellent brief evaluation of competing theories of the
professions.
149. J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA
(1976).
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ing world of practice strongly influenced these processes. 15° Unlike Auerbach, however, he sees that purposefulness directed in
a reformist direction toward "a limited agenda with a moderate
theme" -professional standards and a scientific and uniform approach to law.151 To Hall, bar association activities were at least
as much the expression of a professional group's rational planning,
a response to industrialism, as they were symptoms of the group's
52
racism and xenophobia.
In Hall's account, professionalization is the key to the legal
culture that emerged in the twentieth century. It was, however,
not the only factor, for professionalization was taking place at a
moment of profound change in the general culture, and it showed.
Social pressures of internal and external mass migration, growing
cultural pluralism, and war and national security combined "to
raise anew the meaning of the rule of law and to reshape values
within the legal culture."1 3 Nativism, for example, expressed
itself in increasing attempts at immigration restriction and, during World War I, a patriotic assault on foreign political radicalism.
Enactments such as the Espionage Act of 19171' indicated how
national security measures were to become a major means of
expanding federal authority. 55 Internal migration, specifically the
movement of rural southern African-Americans into northern and
midwestern industrial areas, also brought new cultures and, in
reaction, conflict to American cities.15 Race rioting and instances
of overwhelming police racism underlined the problems of local
law enforcement. 57

150. Of the newly minted American Bar Association, for example, he says, "The new
organization, like local and state bar associations, was purposefully exclusionary." K.
HALL, supra note 6, at 215.
151. Id at 216.
152. All the same, how Hall comes down on the salience of racial and ethnic prejudice
in bar admissions processes is by no means clear. For example, Hall states that "[tihe
organized bar, with its elite of corporate lawyers, could urge reforms, but state legislatures were usually sensitive to the demands of their ethnic constituencies for an open
and diverse bar. At no time were bar groups permitted to control admission." Id. at 257.
On the next page, however, we learn that between 1920 and 1940, in response to bar
pressures, state legislatures did in fact enact a series of measures tightening admission
requirements and that "[e]xclusionary sentiments, rooted in racial and ethnic prejudice,
lay behind many of these actions:' Id. at 258.
153. Id- at 248.
154. Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. SS
11, 791-794, 2388, 3241; 22 U.S.C. S 213, 220-222, 401-408; 50 U.S.C. SS 191, 192, 194).
155. See K. HALL, supra note 6, at 249.
156. Id. at 253.
157. Id-
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Prohibition further mobilized criminal law in response to cultural diversity, becoming another contributor to the local law
enforcement crisis while also adding to federal authority.'- First,
by sustaining prohibition, the Supreme Court confirmed the concept of a federal police power already developing during the
Progressive era. 159 Second, by proving a powerful stimulus to
organized crime operating on an interstate basis, prohibition
prompted the creation of such new bureaucratic and federal
institutions as the FBI 60 -a development congruent with the
progressive model of government.
Hall argues perceptively that ethnicity, crime, and the criminal
justice system in urban areas were elaborately interwoven. 161
Both crime and the criminal justice system were rooted in the
cities' ethnic neighborhoods and offered alternative routes of
upward mobility to that population. 162 Each route continually
intersected with the other, most notoriously at the level of
organized crime's corruption of criminal justice.163 Together, however, they represented a culture apart from that of reformers.'6
Just as cultural and racial diversity collided with "the values
and assumptions of the legal culture"' 65 in the specific area of
prohibition, so it challenged those values in the wider arenas of
civil liberties and civil rights.'6 Late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century legal and political opinion generally conditioned the
enjoyment of civil liberties upon the fulfillment of civic duty,
with all the conformist connotations that implied. 67 Growing

158. Id. at 250-51.
159. Id. at 251.

160. Id.
161. Id. at 254-55.
162. Id. at 254.

163. Id.
164. Id. at 255. According to Hall,
Most reformers came from outside the ethnic and racial ghettos in which
crime was rooted. They only dimly grasped the dynamics of crime in an
increasingly heterogeneous society. Their moral values "were not shared by
a number of their fellow citizens and their legal values were not shared by
politicians and officials." Gambling, liquor, and even prostitution were accepted in many ethnic and black neighborhoods.
Id. (citing Hailer, Urban Crime and CriminalJustice: The Chicago Case, in AMERICAN LAW
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 305 (M. Friedman & H. Scheiber eds. 1978)).
165. Id. at 265.
166. Id. at 262-65.
167. For example, in Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907), Oliver Wendell Holmes
held "that anyone uttering words dangerous to the public interest was susceptible to
punishment." K. HALL, supra note 6, at 262.
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cultural and political pluralism tested that consensus in the
prewar years-for example, in Industrial Workers of the World
(IWW) free speech campaigns. 168 Legal thought began to shift,
however, only when sweeping wartime restrictions on freedom
of speech brought the middle classes into the fray. 169 The young
Harvard law professor Zechariah Chafee, in particular, was instrumental in persuading Oliver Wendell Holmes to reconsider
the import of his "clear and present danger" test, turning it into
"a device to protect rather than restrict future civil liberties.' ' 0
The Supreme Court also responded to pressure from the newly
founded American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to create first
inamendment protections against infringements of free speech
7'
laws.1
sedition
and
cluded in state criminal syndicalism
Hall calls the ACLU a "prototype for the public-interest litigation groups" that proliferated after World War 11.172 The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) was another special interest group that was prompted
into existence by "[a]n awakening sense of civil rights
consciousness' ' 73 and that turned to the judicial process to achieve
goals that the political process denied. 74 Nor was the work of
these groups without reward. Nevertheless, major barriers to
racial and ethnic group equality and to civil liberties remained
in place. To Hall, for example, the Supreme Court's acquiescence
in the forced relocation of Japanese-Americans during World War
II is a clear reminder of how easily "[r]acism, nativism, and
modern] legal culture
national-security hysteria [could influence
75
in ways that mocked the rule of law."'
Yet his conclusion points in another direction. American legal
culture at the end of World War II "mirrored the rich diversity

168. In fact, Hall ignores the IWW and generally downplays the prewar period. The
leading account of the changes in first amendment doctrine during this period, which
Hall does not cite, is Rabban, The FirstAmendment in its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J.
514 (1981). See also Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U.
CM. L. REv. 1205 (1983). For a perceptive account of the IWW free speech campaigns
and their place in IWW legal and political ideology, see S. Zweig, "Free Speech" and the
Patterson Silk Strike of 1913: A Question of Limits (rev. ed. Oct. 29, 1990) (unpublished
manuscript) (copy on file with the author).
169. See K. HALL, supra note 6, at 262; Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
170. K. HALL, supra note 6, at 263.
171. Id. at 264. The Court accepted the incorporation argument in Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925). See K. HALL, supra note 6, at 264.
172. K. HALL, supra note 6, at 264.
173. Id. at 260.
174. Id. at 261-62.
175. Id at 265.
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of the general culture, displaying a continuing capacity to adapt,
though sometimes imperfectly, general principles of equality and
fairness to social change."' 176 As importantly, "a belief that the
national government should promote individual rights and equality, and an awakening realization of the instrumental relationship
between legal and social change," accompanied the tendency
toward centralization of authority in the federal system. 177 Minorities in particular saw in the growing authority of the federal
courts "the-potential for securing protection against local major78
ities."1
G. Depression and New Deal
Many of these trends became clear beyond doubt only in the
watershed of the 1930's. Before the Depression, Hall argues, the
legal culture had given less than complete attention to the currents of social and economic change swirling around it. For this
reason, "[t]he Great Depression [became] as much a legal as an
economic crisis, '1 7 9 and its product was a legal as well as an
economic revolution.
Central to the legal history of the Depression was the New
Deal, and central to the New Deal was the question of the proper
relationship between politics and law, between the public interest
in policies dedicated to recovery and alleviation of want on the
one hand and traditional protections of property rights and constitutional separation of powers on the other. 80 Hall argues that
New Dealers "assumed that the federal government was responsible for virtually every important phase of the national economy"
and further "for promoting the individual well-being of each
citizen." 8 For its part, the judiciary was split between conservatives opposed to any measures that regulated market conditions or undermined principles of contract and liberals prepared
to sanction widespread governmental regulation. 82 The latter
were, of course, in the minority. 18

176. Id. at 266.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 271.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 272.
182. Id. at 274-77.
183. Id. at 277. Hall remarks on the "massive generational gap . . . between lawyers
and politicians of the New Deal and federal and state judges, many of whom by political
disposition and training looked to sustain the very values that were slipping away." Id.
at 271.
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The climax of the contest between these two positions came
after the 1936 election. By then, the Supreme Court had struck
down most of the first New Deal's enabling legislation because
the legislation violated separation of powers standards. 184 Nor
was the commission regulation and administrative lawmaking of
the New Deal's second phase any less vulnerable to criticism
based on the traditional scheme of constitutional powers. 8 5 Confronting this threat on the one hand and possessing a firm
mandate from the 1936 election to construct an administrative
welfare state on the other, Roosevelt sought to neutralize judicial
obstruction with his Court-packing plan. 18 6 Hall expresses misgivings about the scheme's implications for the rule of law: "Even
those supporters of the president who objected to the Court's
decisions found in the Court-packing plan a dangerous assault on
the idea that law was a neutral body of principles that could be
impartially administered."'1
Although the plan was not implemented, it served its purpose
in persuading the Court to yield to the new administrative
welfare state.188 In practice, this constitutional revolution turned
out to be less sweeping than it seemed at first, for federal courts
were still to supervise the activities of the new federal agencies
and interpret the statutes in which Congress delegated powers
to these agencies. 89 Symbolically, however, the Court had affirmed acceptance of the programs that would come to comprise
the core of the American administrative welfare state. 90 "More

184. Id. at 276-77.
185. Id. at 276.
186. Id. at 281-82.
187. Id. at 282.
188. Id. at 282-83.
189. Id. at 284.
190. The Court's new restraint in matters of economic regulation did not mean restraint
across the board. Taking advantage of the extensive discretionary powers to set its own
agenda granted in the Judiciary Act of 1925-"the most important piece of judicial
legislation passed in the twentieth century"-the Court signalled an intention to concentrate in constitutional law on matters of civil liberties and civil rights. Id. at 277. The
Court would defer to legislatures in matters of economic policy, but apply special scrutiny
to legislative action involving noneconomic rights. Id. at 284. Justice Harlan Fiske Stone's
famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938),
was the point of departure. Stone wrote that when legislative action preferentially affects
individual liberties and rights, special judicial attention is necessary to inquire "whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon
to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry:' Id.
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so than ever before in U.S. history, lawmakers emerged as social
engineers, who believed that government had a positive responsibility to fix a basic standard of living and to smooth out the
erratic swings in the business cycle."'191
H.

Liberal Legalism

The trend toward the centralization of lawmaking and policymaking power in the national government; the development of
"a relativistic and instrumentalist view of law".9 and of an
administrative welfare state to implement it; the Supreme Court's
retreat from a dogmatic defense of economic rights and its new
sensitivity to noneconomic rights-in all these respects, Hall
concludes, the 1930's announced the emergence on the American
legal scene of liberal legalism, which became the dominant force
in American legal culture after World War II. Hall defines liberal
193
legalism-"an inchoate and largely unarticulated concept"' more or less as the sum of the reform impulses that had preceded
it. "[I]n its essence it fused the social reformist impulse of
Progressivism, the relativism and instrumentalism of legal realism and sociological jurisprudence, and the regulatory responsibility of the state associated with the New Deal.' 94 This fusion
"held forth the promise of broad-scale social justice by relying
on the administrative-legal process and judicial power to resolve
conflict among contending social interests."' 95 Under its influence,

191. K. HALL, supra note 6, at 284. Hall's description of the birth of the American
social welfare state is inadequate on two counts. First, Hall associates its appearance
and early development exclusively with the New Deal and neglects the domestic impact
of World War II. Second, Hall offers little in the way of critical analysis of the American
social welfare state's inadequacies and skeletal nature when compared with welfare states
elsewhere.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. (citing P. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 295 (1982)).
195. Id. at 285 (citing P. IRONS, supra note 194, at 295). Hall notes, quite correctly, that
such reliance on the administrative-legal process first required the establishment of an
effective consensus on the acceptability of the administrative welfare state and points to
the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) as a key component in
creating that consensus. Id. at 303-04. Hall's description of the APA, however, is rather
bloodless: the Act "imposed procedural order on often unruly administrative agencies
and facilitated the expanded role of lawyers in the regulatory state"; it "rationalized and
harmonized the role of administrative bodies ... dividing the administrative process into
two broad categories: rulemaking and adjudication." Id. This description fails to convey
adequately the role of administrative reform strategies in the antiwelfare state politics
of the 1940-48 period and the relationship between the APA and earlier explicitly hostile
attempts at administrative law reform such as the 1940 Walter-Logan Bill. See generaUy
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Americans after World War II "expected more and came to rely
more on their legal system," and by the mid-1960's this resulted
in a "general expectation of justice" and an accompanying "general expectation of recompense" for wrongs. 196
Hall's penultimate chapter provides details of this postwar
explosion in demand for law and of the resulting qualitative
changes in the legal culture. 1' For example, the profession grew
dramatically and diversified somewhat in composition and objectives. 98 Although the overwhelming trend in practice was toward
consolidation in ever larger corporate firms, younger lawyers
helped start a countertrend toward public interest law, specializing in "civil rights, poverty, consumer rights and environmental
issues."' 99 In the 1960's, the federal government's decision to
underwrite legal service delivery to help fight the War on Poverty complemented and encouraged this new mentality.200 "Federally sponsored legal aid became the cutting edge of the public
interest law movement. 2 0 '
Postwar developments in private law displayed the themes of
liberal legalism. On one hand, property, contract, and tort law
saw a deemphasis of the salience of private bargaining. 20 2 Hall
argues that this deemphasis was in large part a consequence of
the "constitutional revolution of 1937, which dethroned substantive due process and freedom to contract [and] enhanced legislative and administrative intervention into society." 20 3 That
intervention, however, became the basis for arguably the most
significant legal development of the postwar period: namely, the
welfare state's creation of entirely new species of property in
the shape of entitlements. 20 4 Liberal public ihterest lawyers claimed
that special constitutional protections tantamount to recognition
of an entitlement as an inviolable right should shield certain

R. CHAPMAN, CONTOURS OF PUBLIC POLICY, 1939-1945 (1981) (background to postwar
consensus on the administrative state). The APA's impact on agencies targeted by
Congressional conservatives, such as the NLRB, was immediate, and the Act was at least
as important in confirming the substantive limits of the administrative process, later to
be fleshed out in greater detail by specialist legislation like the Taft-Hartley Act, as it
was in regularizing procedure. Id.
196. K. HALL, supra note 6, at 308 (citing L. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE 43 (1985)).
197. Id. at 286-308.
198. Id. at 288-89.
199. Id. at 289.
200. Id201. Id202. I& at 297, 291-99, passim.
203. Id at 292.
204. Id.
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recipients (mainly dependent children, the poor, unwed mothers,
20 6
2°5
and veterans) from state caprice. In Dandridge v. Williams,
however, the Supreme Court held "that most entitlements were
the product of social and economic regulation that state and
federal government were free to exercise as long as they did so
on a reasonable basis,"207 and, thus, the government could revoke
grant a person any special
them. "Simply being poor. . . did not
' 20 8
protection.
constitutional
to
claim
The late 1960's saw the beginnings of an erosion of a quartercentury of consensus on the value of the administrative welfare
state. 2 9 "Consumer and environmental advocates complained that
businesses under regulation had captured their regulators, 2 10
whereas business claimed that "agencies had driven up costs by
imposing unworkable and costly regulations. '21' For its part, the
federal judiciary began to question anew the extent of due
process in agency rulemaking and expert adjudication. 212 The
upshot of these developments was the growth of the public
interest law movement that intended to "recapture" regulatory
agencies for the public interest.213 The late 1970's and early 1980's
saw a different development in the form of a "market efficiency"
deregulation drive in response to sagging productivity, inflation,
21 4
and loss of market share.

205. Id.
206. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
207. K. HALL, supra note 6, at 292.
208. Id. We should note, however, that the Court did establish that the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause afforded recipients of welfare benefits procedural protection against administrative terminations of benefits. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970). Unfortunately, Hall does not discuss Goldberg.
209. K. HALL, supra note 6, at 304.
210. Id. at 304-05.
211. Id. at 305.
212. Id. at 306.
213. Id. at 306-08.
214. Id. at 307. Although Hall does not make this connection directly, new developments
in legal theory have clearly been related to the collapse of the postwar consensus on the
administrative regulatory state. The 1970's and 1980's have seen the growing influence
of the "law and economics" school, which holds that law should be (and that common law
historically has been) based on the efficient operations of the market, and of the "critical
legal studies" movement, professing antagonism both to the key discourses of the
administrative welfare state--liberal legalism and policy science--and to the law and
economics alternative, and seeking instead to develop strategies of personal and group
empowerment. The radically different theoretical trajectories of these two movements
are illustrated in their early texts, including R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
(1972) and THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kiarys ed. 1982). M. KELMAN,
A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987), offers a critical appraisal of law and economics
in the course of a sympathetic but thoroughly academicized account of CLS scholarship.
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Hall claims that both the critique of the regulatory state and
the deregulatory initiatives it spawned have added up to "more
show than substance." 215 Examined in historical perspective, the
administrative welfare state has not produced any dramatic alteration in social relations. It has forced no redistribution of
wealth or social power.2 16 Liberal legalism's regulatory state has
been "a means by which to restrict unacceptable activities rather
than a program of planned social activity."217 Nor has the "Reagan
Revolution" produced any far-reaching alterations in the nature
of the state. As throughout his book, Hall emphasizes the evolutionary character of legal development when seen in historical
perspective. And in historical perspective, "the major features
of the legal system [in the 1980's] seemed remarkably unchanged
and wholly connected to trends extending back at least to the
218
Progressive era."
I.

The Imperial Judiciary

Considered substantively in The Magic Mirror, the postwar
decades appear to demonstrate a more marked transformation in
American law as federal courts, and in particular the Supreme
Court, reflected and promoted "the heightened sense of rights
consciousness that pervaded the contemporary United States. 2 9
This "substantive liberal jurisprudence"' 0 left its clearest mark
in the areas of civil liberties and civil rights. In civil liberties,

215. K. HALL, supra note 6, at 307.
216. For example, government controls over property (zoning and landlord-tenant
reforms) were "clearly within the broad traditions of U.S. legal history and did nothing
to redistribute property between haves and have-nots." Id. at 294.
217. Id. at 308. This conclusion is markedly at variance with Hall's earlier contention
that Depression-spawned liberal legalism had turned lawmakers into "social engineers."
Id. at 284; see supra, note 191 and accompanying text. If indeed the one did become the
other in the course of the postwar epoch, it suggests the distinct possibility that American
welfare state ideology was marked by the same substantive degeneration that British
social democratic welfarism exhibited during this period. For a succinct sketch of postwar
British welfarism, see I. TAYLOR, LAW AND ORDER: ARGUMENTS FOR SOCIALISM (1981),
particularly pages 36-85.
218. K. HALL, supra note 6, at 308.
219. Id. at 309.
220. Id. at 311. In reaction to the "process jurisprudence" of the 1940's, which emphasized the limits to the judiciary's role in a democratic polity, substantive liberal jurisprudence represented a strategy of liberal activism. Id. By the 1970's, substantive liberal
jurisprudence had generated its own reaction, as debate about judicial review and judicial
power shifted increasingly toward original intent, accompanied by growing criticism of
the "imperial judiciary." Id (citing Berger, Paul Brest's Brieffor an Imperial Judiciary,
40 MD. L. REV. 38 (1981)).
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the Court pioneered innovations in areas of freedom of speech,
particularly libel and pornography, in church-state relations, in
criminal procedure, and in privacy. Here, Hall concludes, judicial
review has proven to be an effective instrument for judicial
policymaking, one "by which the justices have restrained majority
will in order to preserve individual liberty."'221 Efforts to restrict
the judiciary's capacity so to act have generally failed, underscoring that, on the whole, "Americans seem to approve its
222
actions."
Civil rights saw the NAACP's assault on Plessy v. Ferguson2 2
climax in the 1954 school desegregation cases 224 and in the Court's
careful direction the following year that the principles enunciated
in its original Brown decision be implemented "with all deliberate
speed. 225 Notwithstanding the Court's caution, white opposition
developed quickly, and by the early 1960's civil rights had become
a maj6r battleground that culminated in the Civil Rights Acts of
1964 and 1968 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 22 6 These
initiatives, together with federal judicial and police enforcement,
added up to "[a] fundamental legal revolution. . . .Constitutional
law in 1987 was substantially different on matters of race relations than it had been in 1945 and radically different from what
it had been in 1896."227 Hall notes, however, that even though
courts ended de jure segregation, "de facto segregation persisted."228
Gender was the other major area of social relations to feel the
impact of substantive liberal jurisprudence, though this was a
late-breaking development. 229 As late as 1961, while the Supreme
Court was busy dismantling the law of race-based discrimination,
it still found in Hoyt v. FloridaP0 that a state could exclude
women from obligatory jury service "because of their place at
'the center of home and family life.' "'1 Nor, indeed, did social
changes in women's roles during the 1960's have an appreciable

221.
222.
223.
224.
(1954).
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

K. HALL, supra note 6, at 322.
Id.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
K. HALL, supra note 6, at 324.
Id. at 325-26.
Id. at 327.
Id.
Id. at 327-30.
368 U.S. 57 (1961).

231. K.

HALL,

supra note 6, at 328 (quoting Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 62).
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impact on women's disadvantaged legal position, for the "larger
culture" continued to consider working women "less than fullfledged members of the work force." 22 Change began only after
women founded the National Organization for Women (NOW) in
1966,m with "one of its principal goals to build a legislative
foundation for women's rights, while pursuing a litigation strategy in the federal courts that would make gender-based discrimination as subject to searching judicial inquiry as was racial
discrimination."
Gender and race together provided the forum for affirmative
action-"[tihe most controversial contemporary aspect of civil
rights law."' 5 According to Hall, as long as it was confined to
equal opportunity measures that did not intrude on nonminorities'
rights, affirmative action "seemed wholly justified as means of
compensating for wrongs done in the past." Measures that took
race and sex into consideration "affirmatively" in the distribution
of benefits, however, were "[m]uch more controversial . . . .One
person's affirmative action was another's reverse discrimination." 237 In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,m the
Supreme Court held that race could be taken into consideration
in recruitment or award of benefits,m but rejected the use of
"rigid" quotas. 240 Since Bakke, however, the Court has approved
private affirmative programs,2' minority set-asides in public works
contracting, 242 and preferential promotion programs designed to
advance African-Americans and women into positions in which
they have previously been underrepresented. 243
Though the path it has followed has been "somewhat tortured,"244 Hall concludes, the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence reveals how "recompense for past harms, rights

232. Id.
233. Id. at 329.
234. Id. Hall notes that although the Court now applies equal protection standards
rigorously, it has not extended to gender discrimination the standards of scrutiny it uses
in cases of racial discrimination. Id.
235. Id. at 330.
236. Id-

237. Id.
238. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
239. Id. at 316-17.

240. Id- at 318.
241. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
242. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).

243. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
244. K. HALL, supra note 6, at 331.
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consciousness, substantive liberalism, and judicial power have
converged to reshape American legal culture."4 5 His judgment
on the merits is characteristically guarded. It is unclear, he says,
"whether the justices' actions have moved U.S. law toward ideals
for which the nation stood in 1787 and for which its citizens
would want to stand today."2 6 But his conclusion is cheerful
enough, if a bit vapid. The very fervor of current debate "is
itself a sign of the health of the constitutional order and of the
continuing connection between social and legal change.."247 Culture
wars notwithstanding, the state of the Union, it appears, is sound.
IV.

LOOKING DOWN TO CAMELOT

But in her web she still delights
To weave the mirror's magic sights,
For often thro' the silent nights
A funeral, with plumes and lights
And music, went to Camelot;
Or when the moon was overhead,
Came two young lovers lately wed:
"I am half sick of shadows," said
The Lady of Shalott.2 8

245. Id. That the outcomes in recent Supreme Court cases have altered quite dramatically in almost every respect the decisional basis upon which this evaluation rests is
surely unarguable. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989) (denying
that 42 U.S.C. 5 1981 provides a cause of action for racial harassment relating to
employment conditions); Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989) (permitting challenges to
consent decrees in employment discrimination cases); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989) (reinterpreting the scope of title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
in regard to disparate impact claims); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct.
706 (1989) (invoking fourteenth amendment to apply standards of strict scrutiny to state
and local minority set-aside ordinances). Erwin Chemerinsky has interpreted the course
of these and other recent decisions as follows:
The decisions of [the 1988-19891 Term will profoundly affect human lives.
Many women will find it harder to obtain abortions; more workers will be
subjected to drug tests; fewer civil rights plaintiffs will prevail, perhaps
lessening the deterrent to employment discrimination; more individuals, in
particular juveniles and the mentally retarded, will be executed. For conservatives, this is a year of rejoicing. The Reagan legacy of a conservative
Court seems secure for many years to come. For liberals, it is a time of
despair. The 1988-1989 Term was devastating for civil rights and civil
liberties.
Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103
HARV. L. REV. 43, 45 (1989).
246. K. HALL, supra note 6, at 332.
247. Id.
248. A. TENNYSON, supra note 1.
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For Hall, to study legal history is to study "the nature, direction, and velocity of legal adaptation" to social circumstances. 249
The results show a record "of systematic change, of law and
society reacting to and reinforcing one another, ' '2 ° with social
change determinative in the final analysis. The legal system has
been "more a river than a rock, more the product of social change
25
than the molder of social development." '
Hall arrives at these final conclusions in the same voice of
judicious deliberation that characterizes the rest of the book.
Throughout The Magic Mirror, disagreements are muted, contrasting interpretations balanced, the evidence weighed and
summed up. When the summary cannot surmount evidentiary or
interpretive contradictions, Hall leaves the contradictions in the
2
text .
Yet as I have argued, this book does seem to contain a clear
interpretive position-one animated by the values of liberal legalism and committed to the rule of law, one that sees the story
of law in American history in essentially the functionalist, distributive, and responsive terms of Willard Hurst's "Wisconsin
School." As Michael Grossberg has recently summarized, law in
that view was "a rational instrument that could be seized by
members of the dominant middle class" to achieve consensual
goals of "economic expansion and individual liberty."2 0 Hall's
restatement adds descriptiveflesh where predecessors left bones.
He develops regional variation as a source of persistent diversity
in American law. He takes ideas more seriously. He builds greater
pluralism into both sides of the Wisconsin School's equation:
more hands clutch for the instrument, particularly in the twentieth century, and their owners' motives are more varied. And
2
he addresses law's repressive potentialities-the "dark side,"'
so to speak, of the force. All this muddies the waters somewhat.
Yet at the end of it all, as we have seen, interest groups and
instrumentalism supply the answers and the rule of law provides
the framework.
Hall's restatement appears motivated, in part, by a desire to
counter the considerable criticism directed at the Wisconsin par249. K. HALL, supra note 6, at 6.
250. Id. at 336.
251. Id.
252. See, e.g., supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text (discussing the penultimate
and final paragraphs of Hall's chapter, "The Formation of Modern Legal Culture"); see
also K. HALL, supra note 6, at 127-28 (discussing the Horwitz thesis).
253. Grossberg, supra note 9, at 366-67.
254. K. HALL, supra note 6, at 336.
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adigm, and more generally at the ideology of liberal legalism that
is its inspiration, by scholars writing from the CLS perspective.
Negative references to that perspective in The Magic Mirror are
kept brief, and, as always, balanced judiciously by implied reservations about Hurst's views. 255 Hall's bibliographic essay, 216 however, points his audience to more detailed comments elsewhere,
which leave no doubt that Hall finds the questions raised and
conclusions drawn by CLS historians to be highly distasteful. 5 7
Their attitude toward the rule of law attracts particular condemnation: "These critics of our legal system," he states in one of
The Magic Mirror'sfew direct comments on legal historiography,
"insist that the rule of law is so much humbug. ' 25 Expanding on
this elsewhere, he argues that by refusing to recognize that
constitutional values lie at the core of American legal development, these critics ignore how constitutionalism acts "as a limitation upon government and as a safeguard for the protection of
259
individual rights.

255. Id. at 7.
256. Id. at 362-76.
257. CLS historians, he has stated with little qualification, reject "traditional canons
of objectivity and neutrality," practice politics and not history, have no interest in
scholarly dialogue, and in the main produce shabby scholarship beset by fatal methodological weaknesses which generally amounts to "little more than a rationalization of
contemporary radical legal ideology in the guise of scholarship." Hall, American Constitutional and Legal History, supra note 52, at 38-39. Their whole approach is destined for
"scholarly irrelevance and public apathy." Id. at 39. Hali's opinions appear to be based
largely on William Nelson's assessment of CLS, since subjected to charming but nonetheless trenchant criticism by Robert W. Gordon. See THE LITERATURE OF AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 62; Gordon & Nelson, Exchange, supra note 45, at 157-68
(Nelson); id. at 139-56, 169-83 (Gordon).
258. K. HALL, supra note 6, at 7.
259. Hall, American Constitutional and Legal History, supra note 52, at 39. To criticize
CLS historians for concentrating on private law and ignoring the public law-private law
nexus seems a little unfair when that has actually been a feature of legal historical
writing in general, including the writing of the Wisconsin School. In any case, however,
Hall is equally disdainful of those writing from a CLS perspective who have embarked
on a study of constitutional values. In Hall, supra note 9, Professor Hall described recent
calls for the development of a "new" constitutional history informed by critical scholarship
as an attempt "to bring to bear historical insights that apparently will motivate the
dispossessed to lift themselves to positions of equality, even if their actions require
overthrowing the existing constitutional order." Id. at 236. He dismisses such work as
no more than "history as . . . practical politics," to be contrasted with "objective" or
"scientific" history, by which he means history written according to the, ideally quantitative, methodologies of the behavioral sciences. Id. at 234-36. Well honed quantitative
methods, Hall argues, can bring an objective and scientifically based understanding of
law in its social context. Id. at 238. On a "new" constitutional history, see Hartog, The
Constitution of Aspiration and "The Rights That Belong to Us All," 74 J. AM. HIST. 1013
(1987). See also D. RODGERS, CONTESTED TRUTHS: KEYWORDS IN AMERICAN POLITICS SINCE
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In fact, much of Hall's book, as well as the books of other
Wisconsin School historians, demonstrates the contingency of
individual rights and limitations upon government. Whether the
subject is property relations, race relations, domestic relations,
sex/gender relations, or employment relations, one hardly finds
a consistent paradigm of individual rights affirmation at the core
of legal practice. Instead, one finds a host of competing paradigms -community, efficiency, family, security, civility, duty, authority, individual autonomy-offered up in the course of ongoing
struggles among individuals and groups, both for relative advantage and for self- and other-definition, each paradigm a contingent
justification of outcomes requiring that one individual or group's
260
claim limit the freedom or infringe upon the rights of another.
Further, as Hall shows, governments participate in those struggles too. When they do so, they mobilize police powers that at
times have indeed been seen as subject to limitation in respect
of individual rights, but at other times have been subject ulti261
mately to no such restraint at all.

INDEPENDENCE (1989); Appleby, The American Heritage: The Heirs and the Disinherited,
74 J. AM. HIST. 798 (1987).
Given the epistemological currents running for most of the last century across all fields
of human knowledge, such a bald restatement of scientistic faith in the objectivity of
positivist methodology is, quite simply, astonishing. On these currents, as they relate to
recent developments in legal theory, see Williams, CriticalLegal Studies: The Death of
Transcendence and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (1987). For other
recent discussions of "objectivity" and "science" in the particular realms of law and
society studies and history, see P. NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY
QUESTION" AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 415-629 (1988); Sarat & Silbey, The
Pull of the Policy Audience, 10 LAW & POL'Y 97 (1988); Silbey & Sarat, CriticalTraditions
in Law and Society Research, 21 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 165 (1987).
260. Mark Kann has commented recently that although individualism has become the
official transcript of public discourse in America, "[a] closer reading of our history suggests
that individualism actually symbolizes a remarkably small segment of American life."
Kann, Individualism, Civic Virtue, and Gender in America, 4 STUD. Am. POL. DEv. 46, 46
(1990). He calls it "a legacy claimed primarily by middle-aged males who have settled
into family life, achieved some economic success, and feel they have earned the right to
resent the authority of others. Individualism does not describe the historical norms or
cultural practices of women and young men:' Id. Kann indeed posits the thesis "that the
individual rights of men were thought contingent on the sacrifices of women and young
men," id. at 47, and that the upshot is not an individualistic America but rather "a
persistent web of engendered obligations that I refer to as liberal patriarchy." Id. at 81.
Advancing a similar critique from a somewhat different angle, Martha Minow has pointed
out that not only is the received version of family law as a story of progress toward the
liberal commitment to individual rights deeply flawed, but it also cannot account for
women's decisions to forego the paradigm of individualism in instances when it was made
available to them in favor of other role choices emphasizing values of connectedness and
caretaking. See Minow, supra note 33, at 827-39.
261. For example,
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It seems to me difficult, therefore, to demonstrate that as a
matter of historical practice a consistent tradition of limitations
on government and affirmations of individual rights lies at the
core of American legal culture. Rather, much of the recent work
of legal historians has helped underscore the inconsistencies of
practice that lie at that core. Nevertheless, Hall wants to retain
the determinate rule of law inviolate. Hence his insistence that,
notwithstanding the contrary evidence, such a tradition is the
core of American law and must be recognized as such.
There are some indirect parallels here with the figure from
whom Hall takes his title. As I mentioned at the outset, the
metaphor of "the magic mirror" is borrowed from a speech that
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., gave at a Suffolk Bar Association
dinner in 1885.262 In fact, the mirror was an incidental rather
than dominant metaphor of Holmes' speech. In this speech, law
to Holmes was the lone and somewhat shrouded figure of a
woman. In one guise, she was "a mistress only to be wooed with
sustained and lonely passion," 263 with success only to the most
committed. In another, she was "a princess mightier than she
who once wrought at Bayeux, eternally weaving into her web
dim figures of the ever-lengthening past."264 In yet a third, she
was a hooded woman "sitting by the wayside," who was "the
providence and overruling power" of a drama in which Holmes
and his brethren were the players. "Fair combatants, manfully
standing to their rights, see her keeping the lists with the stern
and discriminating eye of even justice. The wretch who has defied
her most sacred commands . . . finds that his path ends with
her, and beholds beneath her [overshadowing] hood the inexorable
'265
face of death.
In this imagery, law is removed from contact with the worldone could hardly think of a metaphor more effective in conveying
the separateness of law as an ideal, given the utterly male world

The recognition that there exist rights of life, liberty, property and happiness
which are possessed by the individual and which are guaranteed against
arbitrary and unreasonable invasion by other persons, public or private, does
not imply that these rights are absolute in character .... This is so for
the reason that, more fundamental than the right of the private individual,
is the right of the public person, the State, and more important than the
convenience or even the existence of the citizen, are the welfare and life of

the civic whole.
W.

WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

262. See

OCCASIONAL SPEECHES,

263. Id. at 21.
264. Id. at 22.
265. Id

supra note 3.

1588 (1929).
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of the late nineteenth-century bar. Isolated from human weaknesses, law is knowable, if at all, "only . . .by straining all the
faculties by which man is likest to a god." 266 To practice law was
a different matter: that was to plunge oneself "deep in the stream
of life. ' 267 But law herself remained apart, her inexorable power
derived from her lonely autonomy.
Two of the metaphors Holmes chose for his Suffolk Bar Association speech-the magic mirror and the weaver of the webare clearly recognizable as allusions to Alfred Lord Tennyson's
superb Arthurian romance, The Lady of Shalott. Deep within an
isolated castle standing on an island in a river not far from
Camelot lives the Lady of Shalott, eternally weaving into her
web the "shadows of the world" beyond the castle that appear
to her as reflections in a magic mirror. "Half sick of shadows,"
she is attracted one day by the sight of Lancelot in the mirror
and by the sound of his voice. She turns from the mirror to gaze
for the first time upon the world outside her castle and is struck
down by a curse. Dying, she steps into a barge which drifts down
the stream to Camelot, where her corpse confronts a startled
and fearful population.
To Holmes, it would appear, the attraction of the story of the
Lady of Shalott was what he perceived as its theme of romantic
isolation. At any rate, those are the images he chose from the
poem when depicting the law in his speech. At first sight, this
choice strikes one as at odds with the Holmes who wrote in The
Common Law2ls of a law whose life was experience. It also seems
at odds with the Holmes who, in the first lines of The Path of
the Law, 26 9 offered what looked like a deliberately demystified
account of law as an object of study: "When we study law we
are not studying a mystery . . . . [Rather,] in societies like ours
the command of the public force is intrusted to the judges in
certain cases, and the whole power of the state will be put forth,
if necessary, to carry out their judgments and decrees."' ' 0 Hence,
the study of law was an exercise in "the prediction of the
incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the
courts."2'

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id. at 21.
Id.
See O.W. HOLMES, supra note 4.
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457 (1897).
Id. at 457.
Id.
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Holmes the demystifying pragmatist, however, was also Holmes
the detached idealist.2 2 In The Path of the Law, for example,
Holmes interrupted himself throughout with a countertext of
disclaimers. "I take it for granted that no hearer of mine will
misinterpret what I have to say as the language of cynicism,"
Holmes stated at one point.23 Midway through his speech he
paused again to reassure his audience that he did not harbor
"disrespect" of the law, that he venerated the law. And at the
end, Holmes invoked the sublime: through the study of the law's
"remoter and more general aspects . . .you not only become a
great master in your calling, but connect your subject with the
universe and catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its
unfathomable process, a hint of the universal law." 4
Holmes' idealism was conservative rather than transformative.
The situated quality of his law-"not a Hegelian dream, but a
part of the lives of men"-lent it a "Burkean and cautionary,"
rather than a liberatory, character, one reinforced by a strong
streak of romantic antiquarianism.27 5 This tempered his pragmatism and, I would argue, restored a quality of removal and
6
apartness to law as he understood it.
Tennyson, however, read his poem differently than did the
Justice. For Tennyson, the isolation in which the Lady of Shalott
lived was sterility incarnate. He wrote to laud her conscious
decision to reject the pointlessness of a life spent eternally apart,
not to offer a Burkean warning against meddling with fate. "The
new-born love for something, for some one in the wide world
from which she has been so long secluded, takes her out of the
region of shadows into that of realities."277 This was a poem about

272. On Holmes' personal and intellectual isolation, see Rogat, The Judge as Spectator,
31 U. CHI. L. REV. 213, 227-33 (1964) and Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN.
L. REV. 787 (1989).
273. Holmes, supra note 269, at 459.
274. Id. at 459, 473, 478.
275. Id. at 473; Grey, supra note 272, at 812-13.
276. As commentators on Holmes' jurisprudence have pointed out, his positivism,
although demystifying law, found other ways to distance it from humanity. Take, for
example, Holmes' desire to see law expressed in hermetically sealed language. "For my
own part," he wrote, again in The Path of the Law, "I often doubt whether it would not
be a gain if every word of moral significance could be banished from the law altogether,
and other words adopted which should convey legal ideas uncolored by anything outside
the law." Holmes, supra note 269, at 464. Holmes' highly conceptual doctrinal writing
may be seen as another form of distancing. Rogat, supra note 272, is excellent on these
points. See also Hartog, supra note 33, at 932.
277. 1 H. TENNYSON, ALFRED LORD TENNYSON: A MEMom 117 (1897); see also D. STAINES,
TENNYSON'S CAMELOT: THE

Idylls of the King AND

ITS MEDIEVAL SOURCES

10-12 (1982).
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human agency, about overcoming a distorted existence removed
from life and nature.
Professor Hall's text reads Tennyson's poem through Holmes'
eyes. Like Holmes, I think, Hall does not wish to see the mirror
crack. To preserve it, he rejects those who would tempt him to
relocate law in the world outside the castle-"a teeming jungle
of plural, contradictory orders, struggling for recognition and
dominance." 27s His is a judicious apprehension of risk. Sadly, it
is also an apprehension of vitality.
POSTSCRIPT

They crossed themselves, their stars they blest,
Knight, minstrel, abbot, squire and guest.
There lay a parchment on her breast,
That puzzled more than all the rest,
The welfed wits at Camelot.
"The web was woven curiously
The charm is broken utterly,
Draw near and fear not-this is I,
The Lady of Shalott." 279

278. Gordon & Nelson, Exchange, =pra note 45, at 181 (Gordon).
279. This final stanza of Tennyson's poem was omitted from the 1842 version after
John Stuart Mill's review of the original in 1 LONDON REv. 402 (1835) criticized it as
redundant. See D. STAINES, supra note 277, at 11.

